Research
Work in Progress
- The Serial Monogamist and the Involuntary Celibate: How Divorce Shapes the Gender Gap in Childlessness with Pauline Rossi
Paper presented at: CREST PhD seminar (Paris, 2025)
- Does the relationship between life expectancy and income vary by gender? with P. Aubert, A. Bozio, J. Cribb, J. Geyer, P. Haan, J. Hagen, L. Laun , C. Lucke, K. Milligan, M. Palme, S. Rabaté, T. Schirle , D. Sturrock, M. Tô and J. Tréguier
Abstract: Life expectancy disparities by gender and income are well-documented, but the intersection of these variables remains underexplored. Moreover, cross-country comparison of the life expectancy income gradient is plagued with difficulties. This paper addresses those gaps by comparing the gender difference in the relationship between life expectancy and income in a harmonised framework across five high-income Western countries (Canada, France, Germany, England, and Sweden) from 2012 to 2019. We find that the life expectancy income gradient for men is steeper than for women when ranked by gross individual income quintile in all countries. This gender difference is reduced but persists in all countries when using household disposable income quintile: men gain 46% more life expectancy than women per income quintile increase.
Paper presented at: CREST 1st year PhD student workshop (Paris, 2024), Workshop “Unequal ageing: life-expectancy, care needs and reforms to the welfare state” (Paris, 2024), 2nd Welfare and Policy Conference (Bordeaux, 2025), AFÉPOP Conference (Marseille, 2025), 2025 Essen Health Conference
Non-Academic Publication
- IPP Policy Brief 104: On the design of self-financed Prime d’Activité reforms, with F. Bierbrauer, P. Boyer and E. Hansen, 2024.
Abstract: Earning subsidies or in-work benefit programs have become a defining feature of OECD countries’ tax and transfer programs. This note presents novel results on the efficiency-enhancing potential of reforms involving earning subsidies with a focus on the Prime d’Activité. We show that a test function can be used to identify potential inefficiencies of a given tax and transfer system. These inefficiencies can be addressed by reforms using earning subsidies. This approach also makes it possible to evaluate whether an implemented reform was self-financing. We apply these results to the French tax and transfer system in 2018, taking the case of single people with one child as an illustration. This reform was part of a 10-billion-euro plan to improve the economic well-being of the working poor and the middle class, presented in December 2018 by President Macron in response to the Yellow Vests movement. We show two main results. First, some inefficiencies were present before the 2019 reform. Second, the 2019 reform was not self-financing: implementing a self-financed reform would have required focusing on a narrower income range than the one chosen in 2019, but the reform pursued other objectives. The methodology introduced in this policy brief could be applied to other situations, which could help assess whether there are still inefficiencies in the current tax and transfer system. This is notably the work that is underway in Germany, with a report presented to the Ministry of Labor at the end of 2023 as part of coalition agreements aimed at reforming subsidies for low-income households.